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Abstract The rise of experimental philosophy (x-phi) has placed metaphilo-
sophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philo-
sophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying
conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual
content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s
underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies
and extends x-phi’s positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication’s
broad appeal. But there is a potential problem: Carnap’s account of explication was
limited to empirical and logical concepts, but many concepts of interest to philos-
ophers (experimental and otherwise) are essentially normative. With formal epis-
temology as a case study, we show how x-phi assisted explication can apply to
normative domains.
1 Introduction
Identifying and evaluating conceptual content is at the core of philosophical
practice. Concepts are indispensable constituents of arguments and theories, and
conceptual judgments often motivate or undermine the development of both.
Moreover, subtle disagreements about conceptual content often underlie much
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broader philosophical debates. But despite its fundamental role, the rules of
engagement for disputes over conceptual content remain obscure.1
There is a received view. Traditional conceptual analysis places principal weight
on intuitive judgments across possible scenarios. Such judgments are taken to
establish parameters that successful accounts of concepts must respect. Intuitions
regarding a concept C thereby function as primary data for which analyses of C
account.2
Adherence to this approach has been unsettled by serious doubts about the
epistemic import of intuition, doubts exacerbated by data-driven approaches to
conceptual issues championed by experimental philosophers (see Weinberg et al.
2001; Weinberg 2007). But these concerns, however compelling, leave critical
questions about proper positive philosophical methodology unaddressed. Princi-
pally: if not by intuition, how could (and should) conceptual content be identified
and evaluated?
Rudolf Carnap formulated a compelling answer: explication. The general
philosophical significance of explication has recently been rearticulated and
defended (see Carus 2007; Maher 2007; Kitcher 2008; Justus 2012). This paper
enhances and extends the case in two ways. First, we identify an unrecognized
consilience between explication and experimental philosophy (x-phi), one that
clarifies the philosophical import of the latter. Second, we diagnose a deficiency in
Carnap’s original account of explication, and show how it can be fixed.
Section 2 begins by discussing the controversy over x-phi’s contribution to
philosophy, one which divides experimental philosophers themselves. We criticize
the so-called positive program for x-phi as it is commonly characterized, and argue
that explication furnishes a valuable new role for x-phi. Section 3 develops a novel
positive program for x-phi we call explication preparation, which Carnap (1955)
himself seems to have anticipated. In brief, x-phi supplies the necessary clarification
of conceptual content that constitutes the raw material for explication. In so doing,
x-phi facilitates the explicative evaluation of conceptual content.
Section 4 uncovers a deficiency in Carnap’s rationale for explication, one that
poses a potential limitation for this methodological marriage. In continuity with
scientific practice, Carnap considered explications valuable to the extent they
enhanced what he called ‘fruitfulness.’ For empirical concepts, fruitfulness was
measured in the same underlying currency in which science measures epistemic
success: well-confirmed generalizations. But many concepts of philosophical
interest are decidedly normative. Carnap said nothing about how fruitfulness should
be conceptualized for such concepts. Using the epistemically normative concepts of
formal epistemology as a case study, we illustrate the severity of the challenge.
1 Partly responsible for this is the fact that philosophers remain divided over the nature of concepts. Some
view concepts as abstract objects that serve as constituents of propositions (see Peacocke 1992); others
view concepts as structured mental representations (see Margolis and Laurence 2007). We favor the
latter, but the positions advanced below do not require endorsement of either view.
2 This interpretation of the use of intuitions in conceptual analysis has been denied by Cappelen (2012).
In interesting discussions of Cappelen’s position, Bengson (2014) and Chalmers (2014) make compelling
cases that philosophers do in fact frequently rely on intuitions as evidence. This is not to deny that other
sources of evidence (e.g., arguments) are also important.
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Section 5 shows how x-phi assisted explication can be fruitful for normative
domains. As an auspicious consequence, formal epistemology can avoid overre-
liance on intuition, and thereby the fate of traditional conceptual analysis.
2 X-Phi’s Philosophical Value
X-phi privileges empirical data over other sources of information about concepts
and selectively appropriates experimental methods used by psychologists to acquire
it. The typical protocol involves asking laypeople to apply concepts to specific
questions about carefully concocted scenarios (Did X intentionally A? Does X know
that p?). Replacing speculation about the conceptual judgments people would make
with data about the judgments people actually do make is the overriding agenda.
The results have yielded surprising, counterintuitive, and controversial information
about concepts such as intentional action (Knobe 2003) and knowledge (Weinberg
et al. 2001), among others.
Surveys have thereby proved valuable, but they do not exhaust x-phi’s purview.
X-phi should be understood in much broader terms; its focus, scope, and methods
continue to evolve. For example, more sophisticated statistical measures and
methods are becoming commonplace in x-phi as collaboration increases between
experimental philosophers and psychologists. In fact, the research programs of
many psychologists—which involve methods that go far beyond surveys—address
philosophical issues (e.g. Greene 2003 and Malle 2004), and it is unclear what
distinguishes this work from x-phi other than disciplinary label. In general, x-phi
‘‘takes the concerns with moral and conceptual issues that have so long been
associated with philosophy and connects them with the use of systematic and well-
controlled empirical investigations that one more typically finds in psychology’’
(Knobe et al. 2010, 157).
This characterization captures x-phi’s empirical focus and underscores the fact
that surveys constitute but one facet of the program. But it also exposes a meta-
philosophical lacuna that could threaten x-phi’s philosophical value. How can
empirical data, which describe concepts, play any direct role in the normative
evaluation and determination of conceptual content usually thought to be the proper
(and primary) purview of philosophy? Critics have exploited this lacuna in various
ways.
Kauppinen (2007) distinguishes between surface and robust intuitions, and
argues x-phi only measures the former. Philosophy apparently only concerns
the latter: intuitions of competent participants operating in sufficiently ideal
conditions where only semantic (as opposed to pragmatic) considerations
matter (2007, 97). Since, Kauppinen says, only philosophical dialogue can
elicit robust intuitions, philosophical claims ‘‘cannot be tested with methods of
positivist social science’’ (2007, 95). Although x-phi results require explana-
tion, Kauppinen maintains it is explanation of a primarily psychological rather
than philosophical kind (2007, 108).
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For Jackson (2011), x-phi results are relevant for determining what concepts
we actually have. But he argues that much of philosophy is concerned with the
concepts we should have. While x-phi results might constitute ‘‘an essential
first step in the discussion of the normative question’’ (481), Jackson holds that
‘‘polls won’t be relevant to assessing the final product’’ (480).
Sosa (2008) argues x-phi results fail to undermine the role of intuition in
philosophy, which analogically functions (he suggests) as observation
functions in empirical science. Intuitions provide access to the proper subject
matter of philosophical inquiry, for example, the ‘‘evaluative or normative
truths of epistemology’’ (239). Sosa considers the possibility that ‘‘some
crucial difference between natural phenomena and evaluative phenom-
ena…rules out any such analogy,’’ (239) but concludes that even if it did
philosophy, not x-phi, would point the way forward. Sosa’s rhetorically asks:
‘‘how could we possibly approach such a question except philosophically,
through the sort of reflection plus dialectic that depends crucially on
philosophical intuition?’’ (239).
These criticisms exhibit subtle differences but share a common worry. Put
bluntly, the worry is that the phenomena motivating psychological theorizing (and
x-phi) are distinct in kind from what motivates philosophical theorizing. One is a
strictly descriptive enterprise, the other is essentially normative. If so, the data x-phi
generates and analyzes cannot dictate—perhaps in principle or even partially—the
content of philosophical theories.
The worry is acute. Experimental philosophers themselves are concerned with
demonstrating the philosophical import of their discipline but divided on how to do
so, prompting Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007, 129) to call x-phi ‘‘a house
divided.’’ Unsurprisingly, the proper role of intuition in identifying and evaluating
conceptual content is the main dispute.3 Two views have emerged, the so-called
positive and negative programs (Alexander et al. 2010).4 As currently conceptu-
alized, the former gives intuition a central role; the latter downplays its significance.
Different reactions to data on the well-known Knobe effect indicate how the
programs diverge. In x-phi’s early days, Knobe (2003) discovered a surprising
asymmetry regarding conceptions of intentional action. When an agent brings about
a negative side effect A of performing an action, most people say A was done
intentionally. But when an agent brings about a positive side effect B, most people
say B was done unintentionally. This asymmetry is striking and was initially
thought to reveal something significant about the folk concept of intentional action.
Yet subsequent research shows the asymmetry is subject to order and priming
effects (Mele and Cushman 2008), is moderated by individual personality
differences (Feltz and Cokely 2009), and that a significant minority of folk
manifest no asymmetry (Mele and Cushman 2008). Beyond the folk, these kinds of
3 We remain neutral on the exact nature of intuitions: whether intuitions are beliefs, dispositions to
believe, intellectual seemings with a characteristic phenomenology, or whatever (see Pust 2012). The
main issue here is the evidential status of intuitions.
4 Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007, 126) describe a similar split. The minor differences between the
characterizations are left unaddressed.
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patterns have also been found among professional philosophers (Schwitzgebel and
Cushman 2012).
For negative program proponents, these kinds of results constitute strong
evidence that intuitions rarely (if ever) provide trustworthy data about concepts. For
intentional action specifically, the conceptual vicissitudes revealed seem to impede
rather than advance a positive analysis of the concept. And this is not an isolated
case. Far from revealing concepts with unequivocal content, x-phi generally
uncovers unprincipled patterns in conceptual judgments. For example, many folk
reject the apparently highly intuitive principle that one knows p only if one believes
p (Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel 2013). Intuitions about scenarios involving
concepts of interest to philosophers appear to display the same cognitive diversity
studies have revealed in other contexts (Weinberg et al. 2001). Rather than
complement the traditional philosophical emphasis on intuition, x-phi seems to be
subverting it.
With varying degrees of vigor, positive program proponents reject this
implication. Instead, a two-step method is usually defended. For a given concept
C, the first task is developing a theory explaining the psychological processes
responsible for intuitions about C (once those intuitions have been systematically
collected and assessed). Second, the theory is used to vet those intuitions: to inform
judgments about their epistemic significance. The idea is that ‘‘[i]t is precisely when
we are aware of the features our intuitions track that we are able to reflectively
criticize whether these intuitions are warranted, and whether these intuitions should
carry weight in a mature philosophical account’’ (Sripada and Konrath 2011, 375).
The first step has obvious value, and is one to which x-phi makes a significant
contribution (see Sect. 3). Our complaint concerns the philosophical weight
accorded intuition in the second step. Consider, for example, how Beebe and
Buckwalter (2010) interpret data that suggest the folk are more likely to claim an
agent knew a side effect of her action would occur if the effect was negative (e.g.
harming the environment) rather than positive (e.g. helping the environment). After
discussing five potential explanations of psychological processes responsible for
these intuitions, they endorse a model that holds the intuitions ‘‘arise from general
facts about the relationship between folk psychology and normative assessment
rather than from features that are unique to the individual concepts in question’’
(493). Next, and crucially, this model is taken to support philosophical claims about
knowledge, such as: ‘‘whether a subject knows that p may depend upon the moral
status of actions the subject performs in light of the belief that p’’ (495). On this
approach, proper determination of the ‘knowledge’ concept responds largely to the
best psychological theory of folk intuitions about knowledge.
If pinpointing how humans currently deploy concepts is the goal, this
empirically-driven methodology has obvious promise. But the second step requires
a methodology for evaluating conceptual content and determining the concepts we
should have. And in this regard, the positive program needs development. The
problem is the continued emphasis on intuition. Understanding psychological
processes responsible for intuitions about concepts may identify potential sources of
cognitive error, but how this understanding lends prescriptive force to intuitions that
remain even after such errors have been corrected is opaque.
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In effect, the shared focus on intuition aligns the positive program with
traditional conceptual analysis: ‘‘[the positive program] shares with traditional
armchair philosophy that intuitions about X are a trustworthy source of evidence or
data for philosophical theorizing about X’’ (Alexander et al. 2010, 300). As such,
though x-phi stresses intuitions be gathered in controlled, statistically rigorous, and
systematic ways, conceptual analysis and the positive program as it is typically
understood share a similar philosophical agenda and fate. On both approaches
intuitions regarding hypothetical scenarios are intended to serve their traditional
function: justify purported counterexamples to analyses of concepts, support
premises, and shift the burden of proof in philosophical debates.5 But this alignment
exposes the positive program to now well-known criticisms (see Weinberg et al.
2012):
(i) Intuitions are but one source of data about concepts and other sources—e.g.,
studies of usage drawn from linguistics and anthropology, as well as
investigations of the psychological sources of intuition (see Scholl 2007)—
are likely to provide more reliable information. Absent a compelling argument
that intuitive considerations (even suitably empirically vetted) somehow
penetrate to the heart of things while empirically scrutable data sources from
anthropology, linguistics, sociology, and elsewhere fall short, it is far from
clear intuitions deserve the privileged cognitive status they are often accorded.
How they alone, primarily, or significantly lend prescriptive force to
philosophical theories is particularly unclear.
(ii) Intuition-based traditional conceptual analysis has a shoddy epistemic track
record (Harman 1994). That intuition often leads empirical inquiry astray is
unsurprising (Ladyman and Ross 2007). But history also indicates intuition
unreliably guides conceptual inquiry. As a prominent proponent of conceptual
analysis recently noted, ‘‘The problem for armchair philosophy…is the actual
or potential disagreement that pervades our field. This is not disagreement that
pits experienced philosophers against street-corner respondents. It is rather the
longstanding, well-known disagreement among the ‘experts’ themselves’’
(Sosa 2011, 462). Intuitions are supposed to function as evidence for or against
analyses of concepts. Yet intuitions chronically conflict. Short of a reliable,
non-intuition-based method for adjudicating such conflict, the status of
intuitions as evidence for philosophical theories is therefore suspect.
(iii) Different populations perceive and reason about the world in significantly
different ways (see Heinrich et al. 2010). This is unproblematic if conceptual
commonalities obtain despite such cultural differences, or if such differences
do not influence intuitions regarding concepts of interest to philosophers. But
the evidence seems to tell against both possibilities: it looks like cultural
differences often lead to systematically different and incompatible intuitions
(see Zarpentine et al. 2012). This undermines conceptual analysis as a
5 It is this justificatory role that we find particularly problematic. We recognize that intuitions sometimes
function as useful heuristics for theory development. On this point, see Bengson’s (2014) interesting
discussion of the way intuitions sometimes serve what he calls ‘‘prompting’’ and ‘‘problematizing’’
functions.
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prescriptive philosophical methodology, particularly its aspiration to deliver
universal conceptual truths.
Much research in the positive program is motivated by the assumption—often
drawn from assertions of philosophers outside x-phi—that ‘‘what the folk say’’ is
pivotally important to philosophical debates. As Nadelhoffer and Nahmias note,
these experimental philosophers ‘‘essentially agree with many traditional philoso-
phers…about the relevance of folk intuitions; they simply disagree about the best
methods for getting at these intuitions’’ (2007, 126). But if intuitions lack epistemic
weight, what the folk think is of marginal philosophical significance.6 In fact, work
in x-phi itself often catalyzes and confirms worries about the epistemic status of
intuition that undermine its evidential role in philosophical theorizing.
To some degree, the probative power of empirical data and statistically rigorous
analysis can help mitigate difficulties associated with the comparative reliability,
track record, and irresolvable cross-population differences concerning intuitions
[(i)–(iii)]. For example, x-phi can reveal when intuitions are largely based on
biasing psychological mechanisms. But to the extent a positive program is
committed to treating intuition, no matter how scrubbed of psychological bias and
sources of cognitive error, as providing significant guidance for the second step, it
remains vulnerable to the deficiencies of intuition-based philosophical
methodology.
Despite the deficiencies of traditional approaches to evaluating conceptual
content, concepts remain indispensable to acquiring evidence, evidentiary inference,
and theory construction in philosophy and science. A defensible method for concept
evaluation and determination is therefore still needed. Explication offers such a
method. The next section clarifies x-phi’s important place within it.
3 Experimental Explication Preparation
Many theories and arguments that concern philosophers involve imprecise folk
concepts used in everyday communication, and towards that end they are relatively
unproblematic. But for the same reason these concepts constitute inadequate
cognitive tools for scientific theorizing, they seem to serve theorizing in philosophy
no better. As Kitcher aptly describes Carnap’s diagnosis of the challenge: ‘‘Carnap
takes an important project of scientific philosophy to be the construction of systems
of exact concepts that can better serve the purposes toward which older, vaguer,
more confused forms of language have been directed’’ (2008, 113). As a general
method for determining conceptual content, explication was developed to place the
use of concepts in philosophy on as rigorous and secure a methodological footing as
science.
6 It may be relevant for other purposes. For example, important policy implications might follow from
results about folk beliefs, especially about value-laden concepts. And philosophers should certainly care
about policy implications. The critical target here is the relation of folk intuitions to theories about the
nature of empirical phenomena (e.g. free will).
X-Phi and Carnapian Explication 387
123
Explication replaces or transforms a concept (the explicandum) typically drawn
from ‘‘everyday language or…a previous stage in the development of scientific
language’’ (Carnap 1950, 3) into another concept (the explicatum) guided by four
desiderata: retain similarity of conceptual content with the explicandum, and
increase precision, fruitfulness, and simplicity, the last being subordinate to the
others. Scientific methodology supplies the benchmarks against which these
desiderata and the concepts they employ should be understood. Similarity, for
example, is construed quite weakly.7 Prioritizing precision and fruitfulness over
strict preservation of conceptual content reflects methodology in science and as the
unparalleled exemplar of epistemic success in human inquiry Carnap thought
philosophy should follow suit. When concepts are characterized in science,
antecedent conceptual content is readily sacrificed to achieve other ends, such as
achieving empirical adequacy. Accepting the conventionality of simultaneity,
abandoning species essentialism, and rejecting the frame-invariance of mass are
well-known examples.
Precision for precision’s sake is not the agenda. Rather, enhancing precision
usually enhances fruitfulness, which is the agenda. Among other things, precision is
a reliable tool for ensuring the empirical adequacy of hypotheses, models, and
theories: that the predictions they generate accord with observations. Without
sufficiently precise concepts, it is difficult if not impossible to derive predictions
from statements containing them. Without such predictions, in turn, statements
cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed. Increasing precision also usually enhances
mathematical rigor, measurability, testability, theoretical unification, etc.8 Achiev-
ing these objectives has a highly consistent, inductively well-supported track record
of yielding the main currency in which science measures epistemic success: well-
confirmed generalizations. For this reason Carnap accorded precision a central role
in explication and measured fruitfulness in the same currency (1950, 7).
In sharp contrast with traditional conceptual analysis, explication sanctions
significant deviation from a concept’s intuitive content to increase fruitfulness
(Carnap 1950, 6–7). Retaining similarity is thus subservient to fruitfulness in
explication, for at least three reasons. First, many (perhaps most) folk concepts and
even some concepts found in science are problematically vague. Concepts such as
‘intelligence,’ ‘life,’ and ‘substance’ are so amorphous and imprecise it is unlikely
any explication that retains a high degree of similarity would help discover well-
confirmed generalizations. Second, uncritical talk of the concept X can also lull one
into a false sense of conceptual unity, that there is in fact a unary X. Machery’s
(2009) recent work indicates how problematic this can be. He argues individual
7 Retaining similarity was a matter of degree for Carnap; minimum thresholds were not stipulated; and he
only required that ‘‘most of what previously was said with the [explicandum] can now be said with the
help of the [explicatum]’’ (1950, 6). In fact, ‘‘considerable differences’’ (1950, 7) in content were
permitted. Explication may even change extensions. The similarity condition is therefore quite weak, but
few further details were provided. For more on Carnap’s similarity requirement and the epistemic
rationale underlying explication see Justus (2012).
8 Carnap recognized that precisification is sometimes unfruitful, citing some psychological research at
the time as an example (1950, 14). For a detailed exposition of the role of precision in empirical sciences
see Hempel (1969). With a biological example, Justus (2012) examines how precision can be enhanced in
different ways in explication.
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concepts typically decompose into three distinct types of entity—exemplars,
prototypes, and theories—that are used in different cognitive processes. The upshot
is that the putatively singular concept X is more likely an amalgam of distinct
bodies of information, employed in different ways.9 ‘‘The concept X’’ therefore
embodies a dubious presupposition.
Third, many concepts possess content and encourage implications that would
mislead rather than guide explication. For example, Griffiths et al. (2009) have
shown ‘innateness’ conflates three dissociable features (fixity, typicality, and
teleology). Explications of innateness constrained strongly by similarity would need
to capture all three features and their interrelations. But since biological systems
need not and often do not instantiate all three features, similarity-guided
explications of innateness would likely be unfruitful. Recent studies in cognitive
science reveal similar concerns about the concept ‘free will.’ They suggest free will
is sometimes taken to require an ‘‘executive self’’—a fictional entity operating
above and beyond the mental states and capacities human agents possess (Knobe
and Nichols 2010). Given these results, similarity-guided explications would hinder
the burgeoning science of free will by precisifying something nonexistent. ‘Innate’
and ‘free will’ are far from isolated examples; many other concepts contain content
explication should avoid. In this way, empirical results from x-phi help justify
Carnap’s lax similarity criterion for explication.
These findings might make one wonder why intuitive conceptual content matters.
Being tethered to imprecise explicanda appears to hinder, not advance, the
development of fruitful explicata. But radical revisionism overlooks how folk
concepts often describe features of the world and guide in theorizing about them,
albeit rudimentarily. With its emphasis on precision and fruitfulness, explication
endeavors to improve this functionality by developing more rigorous and systematic
sets of concepts. To pinpoint the content that merits attempted preservation and the
content that should be abandoned, however, a method for vetting explicanda is
needed.
Carnap recognized this and argued:
[S]ince even in the best case we cannot reach full exactness, we must, in order
to prevent the discussion of the problem from becoming entirely futile, do all
we can to make at least practically clear what is meant as the explican-
dum…An indication of the meaning with the help of some examples for its
intended use and other examples for uses not now intended can help the
understanding. An informal explanation in general terms may be added.
(1950, 4)
Unlike his detailed account of explication, in 1950 Carnap said very little about
what methods would supply the needed clarification.10 Although the connection to
9 Machery suggests this plurality warrants elimination of the notion ‘concept,’ but the data he discusses
do not necessitate eliminitivism. This plurality might simply stem from dissociable cognitive systems that
are nevertheless legitimate sources of conceptual competence and judgment (Piccinini 2011).
10 Carnap very briefly discussed a few examples but they are rather uninformative, especially about what
general clarificatory methods are appropriate. For example, Carnap suggested the explicandum ‘salt’
could be clarified by noting that one intends the concept as used ‘‘in the household language’’ (1950, 5).
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explication was little discussed, the methodology he developed later in ‘‘Meaning
and Synonymy in Natural Languages’’ precisely fits the bill. Guided by the view
that ‘‘the assignment of an intension [i.e. meaning] is an empirical hypothesis
which…can be tested by observations of language behavior’’ (1955, 37), Carnap
described a method for uncovering intensions that involves presenting language
users with a range of logically possible scenarios and asking them to make
judgments regarding the concept in question. This obviously resembles the survey
methodology of x-phi—indeed it warrants identifying Carnap as an early pioneer of
x-phi—but Carnap remained open to methodological improvements and
alternatives.11
With its insistence on using scientific methods to analyze empirical sources of
information about concepts, x-phi complements Carnap’s (1955) data-driven
methodology and embodies a key element in a defensible contemporary alternative
to traditional conceptual analysis. X-phi has an especially valuable role to play in
explication preparation (EP). Explicandum clarification, for example, is best
achieved through empirically rigorous studies of the kind experimental philosophers
conduct, which can:
(i) uncover regions of vagueness in extensions and intensions of concepts. For
example, work on ‘intentional action’ reveals uncertainty about the amount of
skill needed to perform an intentional action (Nadelhoffer 2005). And work on
attributions of phenomenal states uncovers ambivalence about ascriptions of
pain to systems that are part human and part robot (Heubner 2010).
(ii) reveal instances of conceptual pluralism underlying a notion. Mele and
Cushman (2008) uncovered distinct patterns of disagreement across partici-
pants’ judgments about ‘intentional action,’ suggesting that more than one
concept applies. Finding such pluralism is one key to diagnosing debates in
philosophy that are ‘‘merely verbal’’ (Chalmers 2011).
(iii) discover sources of bias that influence intuitions. Weinberg et al. (2001)
found that cultural differences influence judgments about ‘knowledge,’ and
Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012) found that presentation order influences
judgments of professional philosophers and laypersons alike regarding several
moral principles.
(iv) discover unpredictable (even if non-biasing) influences on conceptual
judgments. Feltz and Cokely (2009) found that personality differences—
specifically, introversion or extraversion traits—predict differences in judg-
ments regarding ‘intentional action.’ Weigel (2011) found that differences in
temporal distance—e.g. whether a particular judgment is imagined to occur in
a few years or a few days—significantly influence intuitions about ‘free will.’
And Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) found that tacit application of salient norms
impacts judgments about causation.
(v) outline a concept’s central features and its dependence relationships with other
concepts. Work on ‘innateness’ reveals its central features and indicates the
11 Carnap (1950, 8) approvingly cited Arne Naess’ (1953) monograph, then in preparation, which
developed different methods for measuring ambiguity, precision, vagueness, and for testing the
synonymity of expressions involving judgments over paired sentences coupled with statistical analysis.
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problematic relationships between them (Griffiths et al. 2009). And work on
‘free will’ has uncovered connections between ‘consciousness’ and capacities
for agential behavior (Shepherd 2012).
Such significant insights over such a short period evince x-phi’s promise, and
showcase the valuable contribution it can make to explication. Of course, the
contribution x-phi makes will not determine, in any particular case, how explication
should go. Explicative choices (e.g., choices about which features of concepts to
preserve and which to abandon) will be guided in part by theoretical aims particular
to the case at hand. Even so, x-phi’s contribution to such choices secures a positive
philosophical payoff independent of contentious debates about intuition’s evidential
status. The payoff is admittedly instrumental. Its value is not thereby made tenuous
or trivial. At the basis of explication is an appeal to something (well-confirmed
generalizations) whose epistemic credentials are unassailable, indispensable to
science, and, crucially, independent of intuitive conceptual content. The more x-phi
facilitates explication by helping clarify explicanda, the more x-phi participates in a
compelling philosophical methodology. In this way EP supplies a cogent positive
program for x-phi, one that connects x-phi to scientific practice (through
explication) in a way naturalists should find salutary.12
A compelling new positive program for x-phi is an auspicious consequence of
combining the two methodologies. There is, however, a pressing concern that
reveals a potential limitation of our account. Recall Sosa’s claim that intuitions
about normative truths of epistemology analogically function as observations do for
science. One might contend that x-phi as explication preparation leaves this view
unchallenged. That EP plays a legitimate role in the evaluation and determination of
empirical concepts does not establish it plays a similar role for concepts with
epistemically normative content. Empirical concepts serve descriptive theories that
answer to a world amenable to empirical investigation. Methodologically,
explication complements this agenda. But normative concepts serve normative
theories and it is entirely unclear they answer to empirical evaluation beyond,
perhaps, the familiar counsel that ought implies can. Perhaps the type of conceptual
guidance explication provides simply does not extend to the normative domain.
This worry has bite. Of course, normativity comes in many stripes, and
addressing them all exceeds the capacity of this paper. The next section develops the
concern with respect to the specific normative domain explored by formal
epistemologists. Section 5 defuses the worry, extends the relevance of x-phi assisted
explication to concepts with normative content, and shows how explication can
undergird methodology in formal epistemology.
12 Explication also allows negative program proponents to side-step a potential problem. Following
Weinberg’s (2007) analysis of the worry, Ichikawa (2012, 744) argues a viable negative program must
explain how the critique of armchair methodology ‘‘does not generalize to their preferred practices,
including, at least, a great deal of science, as well as the use they themselves put to philosophical
considerations in their own arguments against armchair philosophy.’’ But the concern dissolves once
x-phi is understood as EP. A robust critique of intuition plainly fails to threaten explication because in it
intuitions play no substantive justificatory role.
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4 Formal Epistemology and the Limits of Explication
Explication and formal epistemology emerged from a kindred dissatisfaction with
standard philosophical methodology concerning epistemological issues. The
standard approach emphasizes what intuitions and sometimes fantastical thought
experiments seem to show about long-standing issues and the problematically
vague concepts so often at their heart. Definite views are typically expected
about whether, for instance, the possibility of being deceived in the matrix
precludes knowledge possession or whether veridical perception in a barn-fac¸ade
subdivision is justificatory. Beyond having such convictions, they are also taken
to reliably reveal how knowledge, justification, and other normative epistemic
concepts should be conceptualized. A convincing account of why intuition is
trustworthy in this regard remains elusive and given its deficiencies in other
areas—especially those in the purview of empirical study—there was ample
appetite for alternative approaches to epistemic questions, which many formal
epistemologists attempted to sate.
True to their common disposition, formal epistemology exemplifies explicative
methodology. Precision is a priority for both, and enhancing precision is frequently
prioritized over fidelity to intuition. As such, formal epistemologists generally eye
the intuition-driven maneuvers prevalent in traditional epistemology with suspicion.
In a book attempting to bridge the disciplines, Hendricks (2006, 16) captures the
sentiment:
[W]hereas [mainstream epistemologists] often remain quite vague about the
tacit assumptions and presuppositions of their conclusions, which are based on
intuitions and folksy examples, [formal epistemologists] use intuitions and
examples only to illustrate results obtained within a framework.
Axiomatic logics, probability calculi, and vetted methods of statistical inference are
expected to ground epistemic claims and supplant intuitive judgments concerning
the accessibility of possible worlds, thought experiments, and the like. The objective
is putting epistemological analysis on the same rigorous and scrutable footing as
other formal disciplines such as the mathematical and statistical sciences. With the
clarity precision affords, Carnap hoped explication would put all of philosophy—
including its empirical and normative domains—on such a secure footing. Formal
epistemology is an attempt at one part.
Besides developing entirely new conceptual tools far removed from folk
notions—different game-theoretic equilibria concepts, maximum entropy principles,
etc.—formal epistemology also focuses on formulating precise surrogates for folk
epistemic concepts, surrogates which often diverge markedly from entrenched
meaning. For example, the logically demanding knowledge concept found in
epistemic logics such as S4, and particularly S5, departs significantly from how
human knowledge is usually conceptualized (see Stalnaker 2006). Meaning
obviously changes if vague conceptual content is precisified, but further divergence
is frequently sanctioned, just as explication counsels. A striking example is the
enigmatic ingredient that transforms true belief into knowledge in non-Gettier cases
according to traditional epistemology. It likely has no counterpart in Bayesian
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epistemology.13 The main obstacle to its integration is clearly vagueness, and
paradoxes that emerge from attempts to render justification precise probabilistically
suggest many epistemic concepts and issues will require reconceptualization in
formal epistemology (see Shogenji 2012). Rather than inherit their imprecision, the
hope is that problematically vague concepts can be replaced with a superior system
of precise concepts. Formal epistemology endeavors to do for the theory of
knowledge what game theory did for strategic thinking (see Binmore 2007).
Carnap’s own work speaks to the converging agendas of formal epistemology
and explication. Carnap explicated several theoretical concepts—e.g. analyticity,
entropy, semantic information—with the same high degree of precision and
technical sophistication exhibited in formal epistemology. In fact, Carnap’s (1950)
most detailed exposition of explication immediately precedes his explication of
several core concepts of formal epistemology, including degree of confirmation and
logical probability.
This confluence, the precision agenda of both, and their shared willingness to
sacrifice intuitive conceptual content suggest explication constitutes the best
methodology for formal epistemology and grounds its philosophical value. Carnap’s
rationale for explication could then be cited to neutralize the criticism that formal
epistemology, although technically intriguing, is largely philosophically irrelevant
because it departs from the central concepts and concerns of traditional epistemol-
ogy. Moreover, the rationale reflects scientific methodology and is compelling for
philosophy of science (Justus 2012), so surely it confers the same support for formal
epistemology. That Carnap placed no restriction on explication’s scope as a concept
determination method and wielded it for epistemic concepts seems to clinch the
case.
The issue is far from so straightforward. For Carnap, enhancing fruitfulness
justifies the priority on increasing precision and licenses departures from
intuitive conceptual content. But how should fruitfulness be understood? Carnap
recognized two types. For empirical concepts, fruitfulness was cashed out in the
incontrovertible currency of epistemic success: well-confirmed generalizations
(see Sect. 3). For logical concepts, Carnap (1950, 7) simply stated that the
currency is theorems without further elaboration. The more theorems an
explication of a logical concept helps produce, the more fruitful it presumably
is. Unfortunately, neither the empirical nor logical notions provide a defensible
basis for explication in formal epistemology. The latter is especially
problematic.
Start with the logical notion. Developing axiomatic logics to precisify and
systematize epistemic concepts and their relationships is a common maneuver in
formal epistemology (Hendricks 2006). Just as axioms are said to implicitly define
mathematical concepts, axiomatic characterizations of epistemic concepts are
intended to supply similarly rigorous explications. Beyond axioms, theorems in
such systems also reveal information about concepts and their interrelations.
Evaluating an explication therefore depends on the implicit definition axioms
13 Two prominent and comprehensive introductions to Bayesian epistemology say almost nothing about
justification (Howson and Urbach 1993; Bovens and Hartmann 2003).
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provide, what theorems hold, and what they say about a concept’s content. Proposed
axioms in mathematics are evaluated similarly (see Easwaran 2008). But Carnap’s
view that axiomatic explications should be judged by their facilitation of theorems
provides very poor guidance. Simply counting the logical theorems facilitated is
untenable: almost any axiomatic system would facilitate an infinite number.
Moreover, explication is non-conservative in the terminology of formal theories of
definition (Belnap 1993).14 It therefore may introduce inconsistencies into an
axiomatic system. The vast number of ‘‘theorems’’ such inconsistencies would
generate surely cannot redound to the fruitfulness of an explication. Not the number
generated, but what theorems say seems crucial to evaluating an explication’s
fruitfulness. Yet, if the pre-systematic, intuitive content of epistemic concepts is the
proper benchmark for evaluating what the theorems say, the rationale for
explication has largely been forgone. And since increasing precision encourages
divergence from that content,15 it also seems to work against fruitfulness so
construed.
As Sect. 3 explained, Carnap’s account of fruitfulness for empirical concepts is
not similarly deficient. But the glaring problem for formal epistemology is that this
account is inapplicable. Unlike empirical sciences, formal epistemology is not
attempting to describe or represent features of the world in any straightforward
sense. Rather, it is primarily a normative discipline.16 For example, Bayesian and
Jeffrey updating specifies how beliefs should change when new evidence is
acquired, not necessarily how they do. But relative to this goal there seems to be no
counterpart to the well-confirmed generalizations that undergird explication as
philosophical methodology. For formal epistemology, and normative disciplines
generally, explication’s payoff is therefore unclear.
14 In axiomatic contexts, a definition conservatively extends a theory T in a language L to T´ in an
extended language L´ if for every sentence / of L, T proves / iff T´ proves /. Put informally, conservative
definitions do not facilitate proofs of anything new (other than derivative consequences of extending the
language). Acquiring new knowledge in this way is precisely the point of explication.
15 No divergence need occur if the contours of epistemic concepts are extraordinarily sharp, such that
increasing precision (through axiomatization or otherwise) more accurately reflects their true structure.
On this view the rationale for increasing precision in epistemology would mirror methodology in physics
and most other sciences: precision simply facilitates more accurate description, in this case of conceptual
content rather than physical properties and processes. But this is highly implausible. How competent
natural language speakers actually understand and employ terms representing epistemic concepts––and
what cognitive psychology generally reveals about the fluid nature of concepts (Machery 2009)––shows
this ambitiously precise account of our epistemic conceptual apparatus is mistaken. Of course, these
results are not conclusive if epistemic concepts are abstract objects that serve as constituents of
propositions (Peacocke 1992), and the realm of such conceptual abstracts is precisely structured. We
believe this view of concepts (and conceptual structure) is untenable, but cannot address this complex
issue here.
16 Formal epistemology can also address descriptive issues about human cognition (e.g. Schupbach
2011). Analyses with this focus share goals similar to psychology and Carnap’s rationale for explication
of empirical concepts applies.
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5 Fruitfulness for Formal Epistemology
The willingness to deviate from intuitive conceptual content to increase precision
suggests a close kinship with explication, but some formal epistemologists see the
kinship with traditional conceptual analysis. Hendricks (2006), for example,
attempts to unify mainstream and formal epistemology under the banner ‘plethoric
epistemology.’ For him, formal epistemology provides ‘‘systematic, rigorous and
structured ways of conducting exactly what advocates of conceptual analysis claim
epistemology is about’’ (2006, 162). In effect, formal epistemology is regimented
conceptual analysis:
The value of local [i.e. formalized] analyses of epistemic concepts for the
entire community of epistemologists lies in the regimentation of global
intuitions about rationality, justification, reliability and cognitive strength; the
fixation of their content and scope; and the creation of systematic manuals for
their actual and limiting use (2006, 162).
Here the envisaged kinship is explicit; elsewhere it is tacit. Christensen notes that in
practice, ‘‘Formal models of philosophically interesting concepts are tested largely
by seeing how well they match intuitive judgments in particular cases’’ (1999, 460).
Too much deviance from a concept’s intuitive content spells failure for formal-
izations that model it.
Recent formal treatments of the ‘coherence’ concept illustrate the point.
Coherence is a relation between bits of evidence: the more coherent the evidence
for a proposition, the more the evidence justifies believing it. Several formal
coherence measures have been developed. Due in part to constraints drawn from
conceptual analysis, none have garnered consensus. For example, Bovens and
Hartmann seek to develop a coherence measure that respects intuitions about ‘‘our
pre-theoretic notion of the coherence of an information set’’ (2003, 34). They do so
by constructing a hypothetical scenario and three sets of information about that
scenario labeled a, b and c. Bovens and Hartmann claim that ‘‘Without having done
any empirical research, we conjecture that most experimental subjects would indeed
rank the information set in situation a to be more coherent than the information sets
in either situations b or c’’ (2003, 40). Akin to x-phi’s positive program, Bovens and
Hartmann take intuitive accord with their conjecture to be substantive evidence for
it. Siebel and Wolff argue similarly that failing to respect intuitions licenses
‘‘throw[ing] a significant number of probabilistic coherence measures overboard’’
(2008, 179). That successful formal measures of coherence should pass intuitive
muster is unquestioned.
If preserving intuitive content is the goal, x-phi should be deployed. The
empirically defensible methods of concept clarification x-phi offer apply straight-
forwardly to epistemic concepts. The information acquired can then guide attempted
formalizations. And x-phi provides information not readily accessible from the
armchair, by discovering influences and biases on conceptual judgments, instances
of conceptual pluralism, etc. (see Sect. 3).
But for the reasons already discussed, it is not at all clear this should be the goal.
The case for skepticism about intuition’s evidential role in philosophical theorizing
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is no less cogent in formal epistemology than outside it. Formal approaches to
epistemological issues have several advantages, but formal precision alone furnishes
no resources for addressing the evidential status of intuitions. Nor do intuitions seem
to be the appropriate grist for formal epistemology. Scrupulously respecting
intuitions about imprecise epistemic folk concepts seems misguided when pursuing
the fruits of precisification.
Formal epistemology is better construed as an explicative enterprise and x-phi as
explication preparation (EP) situates x-phi as an important component of this
comprehensive methodology for prescriptive concept determination. But against
this methodology, the problem discussed earlier arises (Sect. 4): an account of
fruitfulness is required that licenses deviation from intuitive content for normative
concepts. Carnap’s account of fruitfulness for empirical and logical concepts does
not supply such an account.
In this connection, recognizing why Carnap chose well-confirmed generalizations
as the measure of explicative fruitfulness for empirical concepts proves illuminat-
ing. Recall that explication is designed to reflect scientific methodology, and
fruitfulness is intended to gauge epistemic success. There are various ways of
evaluating scientific work, so why measure epistemic success by well-confirmed
generalizations? Scientific consensus provides a compelling reason. Unlike other
metrics—e.g. explanatory depth, mathematical rigor, parsimony—there is veritably
no controversy that discovering well-confirmed generalizations constitutes genuine
success. Most if not all empirical scientific work aims directly at uncovering such
generalizations through experimentation and observation. And although theoretical
scientific work sometimes concerns issues not immediately tied to discovering well-
confirmed generalizations, they remain the goalpost by which theory is ultimately
assessed.
Although consensus is much rarer among philosophers of science, on this specific
issue there is surprisingly widespread agreement. There are disagreements about
what some well-confirmed generalizations mean and what inferences they license:
whether generalizations concerning so-called unobservables ground abductions
about ontology is a prime example. But no party to these disagreements disagrees
with scientists that well-confirmed generalizations are the principal currency for
measuring epistemic success. Moreover, most other scientific virtues have well-
confirmed generalizations at their base. Besides the close connection with empirical
adequacy (see Sect. 3), Sober (1988) has shown that parsimony is only a defensible
inference condition when it captures salient aspects of the phenomena being inferred
about, which is in turn only evaluable if the relevant well-confirmed generalizations
describing them are available. And various explanatory virtues (depth, force, scope)
all depend on well-confirmed generalizations to supply the resources for explanans
and targets for explananda. Well-confirmed generalizations are Carnap’s focus with
fruitfulness to reflect these dependencies, and their privileged epistemic status in
science.17
17 Carnap (1950, 7) simply gauged fruitfulness in terms of the production of well-confirmed
generalizations, but his explications (and the scientific methodology they reflect) demonstrate that
well-confirmed generalizations contribute differentially, not equally, to fruitfulness. Explications that
facilitate numerous well-confirmed, but nevertheless trivial generalizations fare poorly on fruitfulness.
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What is needed is a fruitfulness metric for the normative concepts of formal
epistemology. Attempting to develop a single account of fruitfulness for this domain
is probably foolhardy given the uncertainty and controversy about the nature of
epistemic normativity. Fortunately, explication is a flexible tool. In spite of
disagreement about the nature of epistemic normativity, explication can be fruitful
for epistemic theorizing. We indicate how below.
5.1 Instrumental Rationality and Dutch Books
Consider Dutch Book Arguments (DBAs) concerning Kolmogorov’s axioms and
Bayesian conditionalization. Whether synchronic or diachronic, these arguments
reveal a dramatic breakdown of instrumental, means-ends reasoning. This is the
source of their normative force.18 It’s not that bilked agents necessarily lose utility
because they fail to grasp something intuitive about their degrees of belief or the
bets offered, it’s that effective means-ends reasoning requires they adhere to certain
norms. Explications that violated such norms—e.g. explicating ‘degree of belief’ or
‘coherence’ so that Kolmogorov’s axioms were violated—would be spectacularly
unfruitful because they would utterly subvert effectively using those explicata to
achieve one’s ends given one’s means. The empirical analog would be explicating
‘force’ such that mechanical laws no longer held, or ‘species’ such that evolutionary
theory no longer accounted for their origin. Any epistemology, formal or otherwise,
should guard against the kind of necessary utility loss DBAs procure.
This insight can be leveraged because the type of normative guidance DBAs
provide has wider scope than is usually appreciated. Formal epistemology obviously
concerns more than conforming to probability axioms and conditionalization
conditions. Envisioning how formal epistemology would help with more formidable
bookies clarifies the issue. Consider an infallible bookie with limitless powers of
coercion to compel agents to take bets according to their credences. Relative to an
agent’s credences, such a formidable bookie can compel bet-taking and would offer
bets about states of the world that at best yield no loss to bet takers. Though
hypothetical, minimizing loss against this bookie indicates how the deliverances of
formal epistemology can be evaluated; with less adverse odds and coercive
capability the world effectively functions as such a bookie relative to our ends.
Achieving ends requires gathering and cultivating resources, identifying impedi-
ments, and developing means to avoid or overcome them. To aid this compulsory
navigation, formal epistemology marshals tools from several sources: decision and
game theory, Bayesian arguments, classical and non-classical logics, statistics, etc.
Footnote 17 continued
Generalizations with wider scope contribute more, as do generalizations that better catalyze discovery of
further generalizations. Beyond these plausible general principles, Carnap’s reticence about fruitfulness
likely reflects a pragmatic perspective: fruitfulness depends on the particular purposes for which expli-
cation is employed. Carnap’s naturalism and scientific orientation tempers this pragmatism (see Rich-
ardson 2008), but a pragmatic perspective provides a clear way to generalize explication to normative
concepts (see below).
18 Some have argued diachronic DBAs are flawed (e.g. Christensen 1991; Arntzenius 2003). Briggs
(2009) convincingly responds to these criticisms.
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Humans need and utilize these tools to different degrees, but we are all inescapably
playing such a game against nature.
This perspective has philosophical precedent. It is a formal gloss on Goldman’s
(1978) ‘‘epistemics.’’ But to our knowledge its application to formal epistemology is
new, and it affords a notion of fruitfulness with attractive features:
(i) It delivers many seemingly nonnegotiable desiderata. Two main goals of
epistemic agents are increasing their set of true beliefs and minimizing their set
of false beliefs. Explications that advance these objectives supersede those that
do not, all else being equal. And of course the bigger the set of true beliefs and
the smaller the set of false beliefs, the better agents would fare against the
bookie described above.
(ii) Since improving means-ends reasoning is the goal, intuitions (and our
inherited conceptual scheme generally) have no privileged status. Rather, the
emphasis is on better utilizing sources of beliefs and inference methods with
reliable records of supporting instrumental reasoning. Unsurprisingly, science
is the reliable source sine qua non.19 This ensures a thorough integration of
formal epistemology and naturalized epistemology. For example, explications
of epistemic concepts should consider how they might cohere with and ideally
improve the statistical methods that deliver well-supported beliefs in the
sciences. Similarly, whether an explication improves instrumental rationality
depends on accurate identification of the psychological mechanisms that
underpin human cognitive capabilities and how their various aberrations,
biases, and shortcomings can be mitigated (see Bishop and Trout 2005). As
naturalism counsels, what psychology reveals about human cognition is
therefore a critical component of epistemology. Diagnosing these shortcom-
ings and improving our native capabilities requires a clear account of what is
possible were we more cognitively well-endowed. Formal epistemology
endeavors to give such an account, thereby providing an ideal benchmark by
which human cognition can be gauged and possibly enhanced.
It should be stressed that the story of what improves instrumental rationality is far
from completed. Dutch book arguments for Kolmogorov axioms and conditional-
ization principles set a minimal standard. What further conditions share this status
or help avoid less deleterious deficiencies—such as the epistemic frailty various
reflection principles guard against (Briggs 2009)—is an active research area. One
merit of this approach to epistemic normativity is that the results of this inquiry have
a central rather than peripheral role within it.20
19 Science is the sine qua non we know. Other unimagined conceptual systems may be as or more
efficacious at achieving ends. This is demonstrated particularly clearly in debates about the new-found
merits of alternative, nontraditional logics, including dialetheic logics (see Priest et al. 2004).
20 Epistemic normativity concerns a narrower subset of the plethora of ends humans generally value. It is
an open question whether the drive to enhance precision and willingness to abandon intuitive conceptual
content advances those ends. For example, Stich (1990) defends a much broader pragmatic view of how
human cognitive systems should be evaluated. Explications fruitful for formal epistemology may be
infertile on this expansive understanding of epistemology’s scope. Blissful ignorance and intellectual
myopathy may make one happier and even more biologically fit than the tortured polymath, but the icy
logic of the coercive epistemic bookie punishes the former while rewarding the latter.
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5.2 Distinctively Epistemic Fruitfulness
For some, instrumental rationality exhausts epistemic normativity (see Bro¨ssel et al.
2012 for discussion). But many maintain distinctively epistemic normativity cannot
be reduced to instrumental rationality. Those formal epistemologists who seek to
elucidate and apply distinctively epistemic norms—that is, norms about what ought
(epistemically) to be believed, how beliefs ought (epistemically) to be updated, or
how we ought (epistemically) to reason—might worry that explication is unhelpful
given their objective.21 The worry is misguided. Deploying x-phi and explication in
formal epistemology does not depend on any particular normative goal, framework,
or theory. X-phi assisted explication is a tool, and prima facie the features that
render it fruitful for scientific theorizing reviewed in Sect. 3 render it fruitful for
(distinctively) epistemic theorizing. Explication does not compel specific epistemic
norms and objectives, any more than it determines the fact that well-confirmed
generalizations undergird progress in science. Instead, explication simply facilitates
compliance with and achievement of these norms and objectives.
On the view that emerges, intuitions need not constitute the primary data for
epistemic theories. Rather, epistemic norms might derive from broader theoretical
considerations and goals, and empirical data about human psychology (of the sort
x-phi offers) could indicate how a concept should be explicated. Admittedly, short
of a comprehensive and compelling theory of epistemic normativity, no single
account of fruitfulness against which to test proposed explications is available. But
given its important but delimited function as a methodological tool, this poses no
problem for explication. If anything, it is incumbent upon those committed to
distinctively epistemic normativity to explain their notion of epistemic progress in
much greater detail. Perhaps it would involve identifying merely verbal disagree-
ments a la Chalmers (2011), discovering sources of bias or dependence relationships
between epistemic concepts, and so on. If so, the argument in Sect. 3 applies and
x-phi and explication offer valuable assistance. Formal epistemologists interested in
elucidating distinctively epistemic normativity therefore need not worry that
explication is somehow methodologically unfit for the task.22
6 Conclusion
Carnapian explication constitutes a naturalistic, data-driven, and epistemically
compelling methodology for concept determination. We demonstrate the
21 For example, Joyce (1998) constructed a non-pragmatic version of the DBA that established the
following: credences that violate Kolmogorov’s axioms are invariably less accurate representations of the
state of the world than they could be if they conformed, for a reasonable measure of representational
accuracy.
22 Given persistent disagreement regarding the nature of moral normativity, as well as the goals of ethics
and best ways of achieving them, the same points plausibly apply to explication of moral concepts.
Explication is a flexible tool, and we should expect many of its positive features noted above to transfer to
the moral domain. Unfortunately, discussing how specific accounts of fruitfulness might work for ethical
explication is a substantive project that cannot be pursued here.
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consilience between explication and a newer data-driven approach to the study of
concepts, x-phi. X-phi has an important function within explication, a function we
have called explication preparation. The upshot is two-fold. First, explication
preparation constitutes a defensible positive program for x-phi. Second, x-phi
supplies valuable data about the concepts targeted for explication.
As originally formulated, explication applied only to empirical and logical
concepts. Given that normative concepts are the focus of much philosophical
practice, one might worry that the methodology is of limited scope. We show that
this worry is misguided. Explication can be fruitfully applied in at least one
normative domain, formal epistemology. There is thus no general reason to think
explication fails as a methodology for the determination of normative concepts.
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